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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper explores the current state and interfaces of two broad policy discourses, i.e. 
that of policies for knowledge-based economies (KBEs) and policy implications of 
happiness research, which so far have exhibited little explicit cross-referencing. I first 
review the state of ‘mainstream’ knowledge policy associated with the OECD, the 
related but somewhat separate literature on information society indicators, and some 
‘non-mainstream’ knowledge policy analysis. This is followed by a brief overview of 
some of the major policy implications and controversies in happiness research. Next, I 
discuss major interfaces of the two policy discourses. They mostly concern the nexus 
of education, work and innovation. I also illustrate the diversity of beliefs and values 
about some core elements of KBEs in a group of what are usually regarded as similar 
countries, and advocate the use of subjective variables to capture these differences. 
The main argument put forward in this paper is that policies for KBEs should be 
informed by insights from happiness research.  
 
 
   
Keywords: knowledge-based economies; knowledge policy; happiness research; 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper is motivated by two observations. First, much of the mainstream 
discussion of knowledge-based economies (KBEs) seems narrowly technocratic and 
science & technology (S&T) focussed, promoting a best practice model. Definitions 
of the KBE vary among authors, and sometimes by the same author over time, but 
common themes emerge. Some prominent definitions are1:  
 
“…’knowledge-based economies’ - economies which are directly based 
on the production, distribution and use of knowledge and information. 
This is reflected in the trend in OECD economies towards growth in 
high-technology investments, high-technology industries, more highly-
skilled labour and associated productivity gains.” (OECD, 1996, p. 229)  
 
“…economies in which the proportion of knowledge-intensive jobs is 
high, the economic weight of information sectors is a determining factor, 
and the share of intangible capital is greater than that of tangible 
capital in the overall stock of real capital. These developments are 
reflected in an ever-increasing proliferation of jobs in the production, 
processing, and transfer of knowledge and information.”  
(Foray, 2004, p. ix) 
 
“The knowledge economy … is a recent term that signifies a change 
from the economy of earlier periods. The knowledge economy is an 
economy in which much greater strategic importance is given to the 
allocation of resources in 
• R&D and other formal modes of knowledge creation, 
• The formation of human capital through education and training, 
• The management of information, knowledge, and expertise through 
investments in codification and the building of social networks, and 
• The organization of markets of rights in knowledge. 
This is also an economy in which a general-purpose technology 
(information technology) provides a powerful infrastructure that 
increases productivity and offers new opportunities to any knowledge-
driven activity.” (Foray, 2006, p. 9) 
 
The mainstream KBE discourse is dominated by a market-driven approach. 
Knowledge is usually only seen as valuable when transferred (directly or indirectly) to 
the market and earning a return on investment, i.e. when it can contribute to economic 
growth. Also, knowledge is seen as the major factor of production the efficient use of 
which is crucial for productivity growth. The latter is intimately related to changes in 
the nature of work and work organisation.  
 
The second observation motivating this paper is the lack of explicit cross-referencing 
between the literatures on KBEs and happiness research in economics. For example, 
Layard’s (2005) popular book on happiness does not mention KBEs in its index, and 
Foray’s (2004) book that tries to define the economics of knowledge as an original 
                                                 
1 For a critical survey of the plethora of definitions of the KBE and related concepts see 
Carlaw et al. (2006).  
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subdiscipline of economics does not mention happiness or subjective well-being 
(SWB) in its index. This example seems symptomatic of much of the two literatures. 
 
By happiness I mean the degree to which people feel good, or overall subjective well-
being (SWB). As pointed out by Frey and Stutzer (2002, p. 403, note 2) 
 
“subjective well-being is the scientific term in psychology for an 
individual’s evaluation or her experienced positive and negative affect, 
happiness, or satisfaction with life. They are separable constructs,…”  
 
Or more elaborately:  
 
“Subjective well-being refers to all of the various types of evaluations, 
both positive and negative, that people make of their lives. In includes 
reflective cognitive evaluations, such as life satisfaction and work 
satisfaction, interest and engagement, and affective reactions to life 
events, such as joy and sadness. Thus, subjective well-being is an 
umbrella term for the different valuations people make regarding their 
lives, the events happening to them, their bodies and minds, and the 
circumstances in which they live.”  (Diener, 2006, p. 399/400) 
 
However, I use happiness and SWB as synonymous in most of this paper. I extend the 
discussion to additional aspects of SWB only in Section 5 in order to highlight the 
need for including subjective evaluations of specific core elements of KBEs in policy 
formulation. 
 
In recent years the mainstream view on policies for KBEs, or ‘knowledge policy’, 
seems to have been shifting closer to acknowledging the potential importance of 
happiness research, without saying so explicitly. Similarly, happiness research is 
concerned with many features of KBEs, but in almost all cases without explicitly 
acknowledging the knowledge policy discourse. The main argument put forward in 
this paper is that currently the knowledge policy and happiness policy discourses are 
not as closely related as they should be. Producing a closer alignment between them 
should be a high priority. This can be seen to give the knowledge policy discourse 
direction: Knowledge is not accumulated for its own sake, but for a purpose, and that 
purpose is increased human happiness/SWB. Being clear about the ultimate aim of 
KBEs should lead to more appropriate policies.   
 
I focus only on public policies for developed countries. This does not mean that the 
topic is irrelevant for poor countries. However, the knowledge policy discourse has 
been mostly driven by the OECD, and happiness research is mostly focussed on rich 
countries. Also, there are important differences between poor and rich countries in 
terms of the relationship between economic growth and happiness which warrant 
separate discussion.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the current state of knowledge 
policy associated with the OECD and that of related policy discourses, i.e. the 
somewhat separate literature on information society indicators, and non-mainstream 
knowledge policy analysis. Section 3 provides a brief introduction to happiness 
research and some of its major policy implications and controversies. Section 4 
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contains a somewhat eclectic review of the more obvious and explicit interfaces of 
knowledge policy and happiness policy discourses, focussing on the nexus of 
education, work and innovation. Section 5 illustrates the diversity of beliefs and 
values about core KBE elements even in a group of similar countries and advocates 
the use of SWB variables that capture these differences in knowledge policy 
formulation. Section 6 contains some concluding comments.  
 
 
2. Comments on the current state of KBE and related policy discourses   
 
The sorry state of the mainstream knowledge policy discourse: Some recent examples 
 
The OECD is mostly responsible for promoting the KBE discourse, making the 
development of KBEs its major policy focus. It started publishing reports on the 
emerging KBEs in the mid 1990s, and governments took up the KBE concept in 
formulating policies shortly thereafter. A key publication is OECD (1996). The string 
of reports on KBE issues quickly became a torrent, as a check of OECD publications 
shows.2 Some recent, and quite revealing, offerings on the topic by researchers 
closely associated with the OECD are collected in Kahin and Foray (2006). After 
presenting what seems to be pretty much the ‘traditional’ mainstream policy 
consensus, I briefly discuss several contributions to the volume that testify to what 
seems to be the sorry state of current knowledge policy. They go at least part (but not 
all) of the way towards acknowledging the potential importance of happiness research 
in improving this unfortunate situation.   
 
Ásgeirsdóttir (2006) displays little doubt about the current state of knowledge policy. 
She highlights four key policy messages which she thinks need to be taken into 
account if the aim is to promote KBEs in order to create economic growth. The first is  
the importance of more general policies aimed at getting the ‘economic fundamentals’ 
right, like stable macroeconomic policies, policies supporting well-functioning 
markets, efficient training policies, competition policies which ensure low costs of 
technologies, liberalising telecoms, policies ensuring openness to trade and FDI etc. 
The second key message is that the development of KBEs depends on the four pillars 
of innovation, new technologies, human capital, and enterprise dynamics. Thirdly, 
globalisation affects these four pillars, and finally, there is increased emphasis on 
knowledge management. There is an acknowledgement that in future social and moral 
competencies, as well as technical ones, will be important and that social capital can 
support an innovative culture.  
 
In contrast to Ásgeirsdóttir, Kahin (2006) highlights some of the major problems of 
knowledge policy and gropes at prospects for such policy. He does state the 
conventional wisdom that the generation and management of new knowledge is 
linked to innovation, wealth creation, and economic growth, and that there is a 
growing need for informed policy perspectives on knowledge (ibid., p. 1), but he goes 
on to bemoan that “There is too much to know about knowledge to be able to make 
intelligent decisions about it” (ibid.) and that “Knowledge policies remain balkanised 
and isolated under different institutions and areas of expertise… as diverse as 
                                                 
2 For a critical exploration of the OECD’s central role in propagating the concept of the KBE, 
see Godin (2006).   
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intelligence and security, K-12 education, healthcare, patents, agency rulemaking, 
research funding, and the dissemination of agency information” (ibid., p. 2). This 
balkanisation of knowledge policy is a reflection of the “unspeakable complexity of 
the knowledge economy” (ibid.). The latter leads Kahin (ibid., p. 5) to go some, but 
not all, of the way toward acknowledging that knowledge policy might benefit if it 
were informed by insights from happiness research: “Judicious avoidance of 
knowledge is not necessarily a bad thing. Human attention and absorptive capacity 
are scarce. Opportunity costs may be high”. And further (ibid., p. 7):  
 
”Politicians recognize the ascendance of knowledge, but what can they 
do about it? The exploding scope, volume, and significance of 
knowledge in the global economy now exceeds the more slowly 
developing analytic frameworks and statistical bases on which informed 
public policy can be made… We know from living that knowledge 
extends backward into its roots in the human psyche. We know that it 
spans the world outside and the world within. 
We may be slipping into the riddles and paradox.”  
 
In another chapter, Kahin’s co-editor discusses some broad themes that determine the 
extent to which knowledge use is ‘optimised’ (Foray, 2006), and which one would 
therefore also expect to be targeted by policy. The first one mentioned is the efficient 
and effective deployment of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) as 
knowledge instruments. The development of new applications on part of the users of 
ICT (the “coinvention of applications”) is seen as crucial to ensuring the effective 
diffusion of ICT after their initial invention. The second broad theme is that of 
institutions. To be more precise, it is the emergence, transformation, and path-
dependent evolution of institutions devoted to the creation and transmission of 
knowledge in an efficient manner. Foray sees this as the essence of the ‘economics of 
knowledge’ as a discipline. To achieve such institutional improvements, he argues 
that policy makers should use the accumulated evidence on many aspects of the KBE 
(i.e. quantitative indicators) in order to develop ‘evidence-based knowledge policies’. 
He finishes by saying that “Knowledge policies are needed as tools to improve the 
working of institutions but also to inform larger social choices about what kind of 
institutions and mechanisms will lead to outcomes that are “optimal” at national, 
regional, and global levels” (Foray, ibid., p. 15). Foray’s chapter is remarkable in 
several respects. He seems to admit that so far knowledge policy has not been 
sufficiently based on ‘evidence’, but rather “on a casual understanding and vague 
perception of problems and issues” (ibid., p. 14). Also, he does not define what he 
means by ‘efficient‘, ‘optimised’ and ‘optimal’ production and use of knowledge.  
 
Gault (2006) surveys the official statistics measuring ‘knowledge and its economic 
effects’. He admits that in their present state they are insufficient and calls for more 
and better indicators if we want more effective evidence-based policy. The only hint 
that a much wider range of indicators might have to be considered that goes beyond 
‘economic effects’ is an acknowledgement that knowledge activities also give rise to 
wider policy issues, i.e. ethical issues (for example in relation to research on living 
things) and moral issues (for example in relation to cloning or stem cell research). 
 
Schuller (2006) probably comes closest among the authors in Kahin and Foray (2006) 
to making a link between KBEs and happiness. Discussing the growth in the volume 
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of knowledge, he alludes to the relevance of nested hierarchies such as 
facts/information/knowledge/wisdom as relevant concepts and acknowledges that 
knowledge accumulation is not of course a simple linear process. He further 
comments that “in any case, it is clear that the mere accumulation, even of wisdom 
(or whatever is conceived of as at the top of the hierarchy), is not enough to 
guarantee progress and satisfaction” (ibid., p. 84). However, he stops short of 
making an explicit connection between the KBE literature and that on happiness. 
Rather, he puts forward a framework for extending the analysis of social capital, 
especially trust, in the generation, distribution and verification of knowledge.    
 
The need for a re-direction of information society indicators research  
 
There is a large KBE-related, but somewhat separate, literature that focuses on 
information society indicators. I briefly comment on some recent assessments of the 
field and the research agendas proposed. They seem to come close to explicitly 
considering insights from happiness research.   
 
Grigorovici et al. (2004) survey the literature on macro-level information society 
indicators and various e-readiness measures.3 They lament the lack of a 
comprehensive theory guiding these efforts and propose constructing a multi-level 
multi-factor index based on a structural modelling approach. They agree that a vast 
range of social impacts of ICT needs to be measured and monitored, not just 
economic impacts. Also, to better understand KBEs, improved indicators are needed 
for measuring knowledge inputs, stocks and flows, outputs, networks and learning. 
They advocate that future research should develop closer links between information 
measurement models and Quality of Life models 
 
“since ultimately the goal of any endeavour for measuring the 
“Information Society”, “Technology Achievement” or “E-readiness”, is 
to be able to quantify and track their impacts and changes on people’s 
living conditions at various levels of analysis … Unfortunately, most of 
the e-metrics research done currently seems to have forgotten the real 
objective, ...” (ibid., p. 193).  
 
While Grigorovici et al.’s sentiments seem similar to mine, Quality of Life is usually 
perceived as a much broader concept than happiness. In fact, advocates of Quality of 
Life measures may explicitly reject the use of happiness measures (see, for example, 
Cobb, 2000).     
 
More recently, Menou and Taylor (2006, p. 261) have commented that: 
 
“In spite of a sustained public policy discourse over last several 
decades, the information society-related policies tend to be mushy 
products of an odd mix of futurology, social forces, aspirations, 
ideology, and interest-group politics, among other things. It is rarely 
                                                 
3 Composite indices that try to capture some essential but elusive feature of KBEs have mushroomed. 
A recent example is the International Telecommunications Union’s (ITU, 2007) ICT Opportunity 
Index. Others include the ITU’s ‘Digital Access Index’, the World Economic Forum’s ‘Network 
Readiness Index’, the International Data Corporation’s ‘Information Society Index’, the United Nations 
Development Programme’s ‘Technology Achievement Index’, etc.   
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admitted that they should be informed by reliable observations and 
data.”  
 
In their view, developing appropriate ‘information metrics’ to measure important 
aspects of information/KBEs and societies and to guide policy is still a ‘grand 
challenge’, despite the long history of some of these efforts and their renewed 
proliferation in recent years. Menou and Taylor’s (2006) aim is to show that 
alternative ways of measuring the information society are necessary and feasible. To 
meet the grand challenge, they see the need for a new coherent field of academic 
study that addresses a number of critical areas. Most of these challenges seem to point 
to the need to incorporate insights from happiness research, but again the authors 
never quite manage to make the connection.   
 
One of the challenges identified by Menou and Taylor is ‘to define the universe to be 
measured’. Achieving a universally accepted definition of information, knowledge 
and wisdom may be an open-ended undertaking close to the punishment of Sisyphus. 
However, they insist that some clarity and rigour is an elementary requirement and 
not beyond reach. The notion that information and mind are fundamental constituents 
of reality is mentioned in connection with this challenge. Another challenge is ‘the 
definition of objects and phenomena to include in the universe’. Menou and Taylor 
observe that information measurements often are not comprehensive enough, 
excluding whatever is not informational, or at least not directly related to information 
resources and activities, as if informational and non-informational domains could 
exist without each other. A further challenge is to frame measures within established 
or in progress social theories. It is not yet clear to Menou and Taylor what the 
appropriate theories are. The challenge is to test those theories that seem relevant and 
promising.  
 
The neglect of happiness research becomes even less understandable when one 
considers that another major challenge identified by Menou and Taylor is to find ways 
to bring back the ordinary citizen, who is supposed to benefit from the development 
of the information society, as key player in the process of observation, analysis, and 
assessment of the transformations taking place. The ultimate challenge according to 
Menou and Taylor (ibid., p. 265) is to “advance our understanding and allow for 
enlightened actions that ensure that the information revolution does not lead to more 
damage than benefits,…”. I would argue that at least some of the data and new 
indices needed are already available from happiness research. 
  
Only one of the four contributions introduced by Menou and Taylor (2006) comes 
close to the use of subjective survey data that I advocate in Section 5 below. In an 
Estonian case study, Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt (2006) argues that cultural and social 
indicators of various life domains need to supplement traditional technology-centric 
information society measures in order to properly assess the complexity of 
information society related issues. Of particular interest here is Pruulmann-
Vengerfeldt’s inclusion of questions about the general attitude of survey participants 
towards technology, and inclusion of lifestyle variables indicating which groups in 
society are more or less likely to adopt new technologies.   
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Some insights from the non-mainstream knowledge policy discourse 
 
I briefly discuss an example of a group of non-mainstream analysts who go beyond 
the usual OECD policy discussion and explore deeper issues related to knowledge 
policy. Although they often get tantalisingly close to advocating the use of 
happiness/SWB data, they also stop short of explicitly advocating their use.     
 
As the title of their book suggests, Rooney et al. (2003) concentrate on foundations 
and frameworks for public policy in KBEs, eschewing detailed and specific policy 
prescriptions. They employ a complex system paradigm in order to broaden what they 
perceive as a mostly naïve and inappropriate, i.e. narrowly technocratic, mainstream 
knowledge policy discourse that largely neglects or marginalises social, ethical and 
cultural dimensions.4 Much in their story depends on an appropriate social 
environment, or the beneficial aspects of social capital: 
 
“Knowledge is…a social as well as an individual quality that should 
flourish in an environment of plenitude, free exchange of ideas and 
learning. Settings in which anti-social behaviour predominates amount 
to poor economic settings for knowledge-based economies. Robust and 
purposeful relations and communication underpin such economies.” 
(Rooney et al., 2003, p. 9). 
 
They therefore argue that knowledge policy must have a social and communication 
focus, and must go beyond a consideration of information- and technology-related 
issues only. Policymakers must implement policies to nourish, protect and harvest the 
knowledge commons, be ready for and exploit knowledge waves, and prepare 
communities for participation in KBEs. The latter includes policies to introduce 
cultural change away from ego-driven individualism towards sustainable consumption 
(ibid., chapter 8) and would seem to link easily to insights from happiness research. 
Also, the authors argue that a KBE should by definition be fair, equitable and just, all 
dimensions whose links to happiness might seem obvious. However, Rooney et al.’s 
parting comments in the book’s epilogue take a different track. Similar to (but 
preceding) Schuller (2006), they extend the data/information/knowledge hierarchy by 
adding a top level, i.e. wisdom, without referring to the happiness literature:    
 
“There is little understanding of wisdom in knowledge-related 
discussion generally…Just as more and more information does not 
necessarily make more or better knowledge, neither does more and more 
knowledge make wisdom…More and more knowledge is not a sensible 
objective…While knowledge can be wonderful, wisdom is better…Wise 
people...know better than others and are recognized as being people 
who know better. This means that wisdom is a scarce and valuable 
social quality that should be close to the centre of knowledge-related 
policy debates…” (Rooney et al., 2003, p. 154). 
 
In particular, they advocate an Aristotelian approach to (secular and practical) 
wisdom. In a later paper, Rooney and Mckenna (2005) elaborate this position at 
                                                 
4 Rooney (2005) conducts a text analysis of a large body of policy documents from around the 
world to further substantiate his view about mainstream knowledge policy.  
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length and try to make a case for wisdom to become an explicit objective for KBEs. 
As they put it (ibid. p. 308): 
 
“Without wisdom, any social or economic system is deficient because of 
the power of wisdom to provide good judgement, perspicacity, and 
ethically applied knowledge. Yet knowledge about how to be wise, how 
to foster wisdom, and how to recognize it has been lost in the dominant 
discourses of the industrialized world.” 
 
In their view, unless critical and transcendent aspects of knowing, such as curiosity, 
creativity, insight and imagination, are accorded higher value in knowledge policy, 
there is little chance for wisdom to become an explicit objective for KBEs. However, 
the emphasis on creating knowledge and innovation at faster and faster rates and the 
associated rapid rate of change seems to have created a ‘politics of urgency’ that 
leaves little time for reflection and consideration (ibid.).   
 
Without wanting to digress into a long philosophical debate, I would argue that 
Rooney and his co-authors might well be right about the ‘ultimate goal’ of wisdom as 
the key factor in deriving appropriate knowledge policy, but that the related (if 
possibly lesser but more measurable) human quality of happiness is an important, if 
not indispensable, ingredient in this quest. They might not disagree, as they 
sometimes refer to insights from psychology and neuroscience, but Rooney et al. 
never make the step towards embracing happiness research.5           
 
 
3. Major policy issues in happiness research  
 
Happiness researchers hold the view that happiness/SWB indicators add important 
information beyond that contained in the conventional economic and social indicators, 
and that they are therefore important in informing policy debates. They have not held 
back in offering policy advice, although little, if any, has directly and explicitly 
addressed the KBE discourse. I briefly discuss some of the major policy issues and 
controversies in happiness research as highlighted by a number of prominent 
researchers. This is not meant to be a representative review. Rather, I hope to convey 
the flavour of much of the current happiness policy debate.  
 
The happiness paradox and the happiness of nations 
 
The starting point for modern happiness research in economics is the observation that 
in the developed world, on average people are no (or not much) happier than 50 years 
ago, despite the large increases in real incomes over that time period. This is variously 
labelled the ‘Easterlin paradox’, due to the seminal work of Easterlin (1974), or the 
‘happiness paradox’ (Layard, 2005).6 It is due to certain features of human nature, in 
                                                 
5 Also note that some happiness researchers, for example Helliwell (2003, p. 333/334), have 
explicitly commented on the link between Aristotelian philosophy and modern happiness 
research.   
6 For a brief review of this issue see, for example, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006). 
Veenhoven, one of the pioneers of happiness research, has recently argued that since 1973 
happiness has continued to increase in rich countries (Veenhoven, 2006). Using his concept of 
happy-live-years, which is a happiness index adjusted for average length of life, he finds that 
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particular the need for social comparisons (people care mostly about their relative 
income) and habituation to higher income (the hedonic treadmill). Layard (2005) 
argues that both features distort people’s incentives and result in them striving to 
work too much and earn too much money, at the expense of their leisure. Also, 
income inequality is bad in the sense that extra income brings less benefit to the rich 
than the poor. How to increase happiness is the new challenge and frontier – and 
much more difficult than traditional wealth-creation. Layard does not add that wealth-
creation in developed countries, with which he deals exclusively in his book, is 
largely and intensely knowledge-driven.  
 
There seems to be a consensus amongst happiness researchers that most of the 
average level of happiness in a country (i.e. the ‘happiness of nations’) can be 
explained by a relatively small number of objective factors. Layard (ibid., ch. 5), 
summarising findings by Helliwell (2003), mentions the ‘”Big Seven”: Family 
relationships, financial situation, work, community and friends, health, personal 
freedom and personal values.7 Especially divorce rates and unemployment rates have 
major negative impacts on the happiness of nations. 
 
Layard (2005) draws a wide range of specific policy conclusions from the findings 
about happiness/SWB, for example that the struggle for higher relative income should 
be discouraged by higher income taxes, that tax allowances for most advertising 
should be stopped, that policies should focus on improving the welfare of children and 
enable flexible working practises, that much more money needs to be spend on 
helping people with mental illnesses (only a fraction of whom receive treatment 
today). Moreover, he acknowledges (ibid., p. 145) that almost all policies, i.e. 
including those not specifically derived from happiness research, affect happiness 
through many channels.   
 
Layard (2006) covers similar terrain, but aimed directly at economists, not the general 
public. He argues that the theory behind public economics needs radical reform (ibid., 
p. C24): “The challenge to public economics is to incorporate the findings from 
modern psychology while retaining the rigour of the cost-benefit framework…”. He 
concludes that economics uses exactly the right framework for thinking about public 
policy, but the wrong account of what makes people happy.8 He sees a need for 
economics to become much more inter-disciplinary, requiring collaboration between 
economists and other social scientists, especially psychologists. 
                                                                                                                                            
life in modern society is generally getting better, and he expects this trend to continue. This is 
not due to the already happy getting happier, but to a reduced number of unhappy persons in 
the population. In most countries there has been a simultaneous rise in happiness and 
longevity. However, in the UK and US, happy life years have risen only due to the 
lengthening of life, not the degree of happiness. Only one country, i.e. Belgium, experienced 
a decline in happy-live-years (ibid.).  
7 More precisely, the following factors have been found to explain 80% of the variation of 
happiness reported in the World Values Surveys for 50 countries: the divorce rate, the 
unemployment rate, the level of trust in society, membership in non-religious organisations, 
quality of government, the fraction of the population believing in God (Layard, 2005, p. 71). 
8 Layard (2006, p. C31) states that “Broadly, economics says that utility increases with the 
opportunities for voluntary exchange. This overlooks the huge importance of involuntary 
interactions between people – of how others affect our norms, our aspirations, our feelings of 
what is important, and our experience of whether the world is friendly of threatening.” 
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Ng and Ho (2006) provide what could be called an East Asian perspective on 
happiness policy. They agree that public policy can contribute to the pursuit of 
happiness at the individual level. However, given the track record of public policy in 
some of the fast growing East Asian countries, sometimes it might imply governments 
doing less. In Ng and Ho’s words (ibid., p. 3): “…although we agree that 
governments do not have to, and indeed should not, pursue happiness for their 
citizens, they can facilitate that pursuit by creating an environment that favors such 
pursuits.” In particular, they emphasize the importance of the rule of law and basic 
freedoms that are common in today’s democratic nations. In the concluding chapter of 
Ng and Ho (2006), however, one of the editors is more explicit about the public 
expenditure implications of happiness research. Ng (2006) argues that happiness 
studies imply that the optimal level of public spending is higher than most economists 
believe, and that diversion of resources from the private to the public sector in 
‘appropriate’ areas (like research, education, health and environmental protection) are 
likely to be welfare enhancing.9  
 
What can economists learn from happiness research? 
 
Frey and Stutzer (2002) specifically ask the question what economists can learn from 
happiness research. While they do not directly mention KBEs anywhere, some of the 
issues they discuss will be taken up again in Section 4 below.10 Frey and Stutzer first 
discuss reasons for economists to consider happiness research: i) Happiness is 
generally considered an ultimate goal of life. ii) It should be important for economic 
policy. At the micro-level, Pareto-improving policies are often impossible, i.e. social 
actions usually entail costs for some individuals. Hence, they argue, an evaluation of 
the net effects, in terms of individual utilities, is needed.11 At the macro-level, 
economists deal with trade-offs, especially that between unemployment and inflation, 
and happiness research emphasises the high non-pecuniary costs of unemployment 
which should be taken into account in economic policy decisions. iii) As their own 
research has highlighted, happiness is influenced by institutional conditions such as 
the quality of governance and the size of social capital. iv) Happiness research can 
help economists to understand the formation of SWB in general, thereby shedding 
new light on basic concepts and assumptions of economic theory and also on some 
empirical puzzles. In particular, happiness researchers have found consistently large 
influences of nonfinancial variables on self-reported satisfaction, which arguably 
should be taken into account alongside economic variables. However, causality issues 
loom large, i.e. economic variables like income, unemployment, and inflation, as well 
as institutional factors, affect happiness, but happiness might also affect these 
variables in turn.12  
 
                                                 
9 Also see Ng (2002a,b). He regards increased public spending in these areas as a way to 
overcome the East-Asian countries’ ‘happiness gap’ (i.e. their very low happiness scores 
despite spectacular economic growth). 
10Also see Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006) who provide a shorter but more recent survey 
covering much of the same ground.   
11 Frey and Stutzer (2002) discuss at some length why they regard reported SWB as a 
satisfactory empirical approximation of individual utility. 
12 On this point, see the more extended discussion in Diener and Seligman (2004).  
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In the summary section of their survey paper, Frey and Stutzer (2002) discuss major 
implications for economic policy. For example, they argue for the use of happiness 
measures in the evaluation of the effects of government expenditure. Also, welfare 
policy needs to focus more on creating employment instead of financial support for 
the unemployed because the latter will only compensate for the pecuniary losses of 
unemployment. The definition of poverty should be changed to focus on SWB instead 
of disposable income, i.e. antipoverty policy should be redesigned in light of findings 
from happiness research. Tax policy should take effects on SWB into account, 
although Frey and Stutzer are much more cautious in their policy prescription than is 
Layard.   
 
Finally, Frey and Stutzer (2002) discuss a number of open issues in happiness 
research where progress is especially needed: i) Effects of happiness on behaviour; 
happiness may influence many important economic decisions (for example with 
regard to consumption, work, investment, political behaviour). This is the issue of 
reverse causality. ii) Application of happiness analysis in further areas 
(discrimination of women, quality of life indicators, growth analysis), emphasising a 
broader set of institutions than done so far. iii) The application of more advanced 
methods of analysis (using panel data instead of cross-section data). iv) Further 
improvements in happiness measurement. Suffice it to say that all of these issues are 
still with us.   
 
Economists focussing on happiness research take most of their clues from 
psychologists. Not surprisingly, the latter tend to produce the more comprehensive 
and detailed accounts of psychological findings relevant to happiness research. Diener 
and Seligman (2004), for example, mention research on the potentially negative 
effects of materialism, such as low self-esteem, greater narcissism, less empathy, less 
intrinsic motivation, more conflictual relationships, greater emphasis on social 
comparisons (the hedonic treadmill) and, generally, put more emphasis on what seems 
to be an epidemic of mental disorders in wealthy societies, all of which contribute to 
stagnant life satisfaction. They regard mental health as an area in which historical 
trends in SWB have been startlingly and strongly opposite the trends in economics, 
and where governmental and institutional policies can make an enormous difference 
to well-being, a theme which has also been taken up by Layard.13 Diener and 
Seligman do not explain what the increase in mental disorders in wealthy countries is 
mostly due to. They call it a paradox (ibid., p. 16). However, one is tempted to ask 
whether the rise in mental disorders and the rise of KBEs are co-incidental, or in some 
way causally related.  
 
Should policy aim at directly maximising national happiness?  
 
Frey and Stutzer (2007) ask the important question whether public policies should be 
directly aimed at maximising national happiness. Should happiness maximisation be 
the ultimate goal by which policy success is measured? Should aggregate happiness, 
now that it can be measured adequately, be maximised as a social welfare function? 
                                                 
13 They note that mental health is an area where economic indicators and SWB can easily 
move in opposite directions, i.e. costs associated with treating mental illnesses can increase 
GDP, while the prevalence of mental illnesses reduces SWB (Diener and Seligman, 2004, p. 
17). This trend will only increase in future should more people receive treatment.  
 12
This issue is hotly debated amongst happiness researchers. Layard (2005, 2006) 
explicitly advocates this goal. Others do so implicitly.14 Frey and Stutzer, however, 
like Ng and Ho (2006), disagree. They provide arguments for their alternative view 
that insights gained from happiness research should be taken as (one among many) 
inputs into the political process, i.e. they should improve the nature of the political 
process. In their view, different issues require different measures and indicators of 
well-being. They do not, however, argue against using aggregate happiness indicators. 
They are important macroeconomic inputs in the political discourse, helping to 
overcome the currently dominant orientation towards GDP. Frey and Stutzer just 
argue against explicitly trying to maximise them.   
 
Kahneman and Krueger (2006) position themselves somewhere in the middle of the 
spectrum. They argue that a measure of Gross National Happiness would seem an 
overly ambitious goal given the present state of knowledge. They therefore advocate 
the use of SWB measures as a complement to traditional analysis.15 Similarly, Diener 
(2006) has proposed guidelines and recommendations for the development and use of 
national indicators (note the plural!) of SWB and subjective ill-being in policy 
debates, which were endorsed by a list of fifty-one prominent researchers. The use of 
multiple SWB indicators is suggested by the diversity of policy domains where 
findings from happiness research should be relevant.16 It can be expected that the 
existing measures of national well-being will undergo substantial developed in future, 
and that additional measures will be development and refined over time.  
 
Intimately related to this discussion is that of the political neutrality, or otherwise, of 
well-being indicators. Some prominent happiness advocates, such as Layard, might 
give the impression that happiness/SWB considerations are part of a leftist agenda.17 
By contrast, Diener and Seligman (2004) believe that SWB measures are and must 
remain descriptive, not prescriptive. They “simply yield facts that can be used either 
by the left or by the right, and ... they provide an added way to better assess the 
claims of various political viewpoints by revealing how policies actually influence 
wellbeing” (ibid., p. 24). Diener and Seligman note that the issue of political 
neutrality of happiness/SWB indicators does not seem different from that of any other 
type of indicator (for example economic indicators).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 For details, see Frey and Stutzer (2007). 
15 They also propose their own alternative SWB indicator, or rather misery indicator, the U-
Index (for ‘unpleasant’ or ‘undesirable’). This indicator is fundamentally connected to time 
allocation, measuring the proportion of time that people spend in an unpleasant state. 
Kahneman and Krueger regard this measure as particularly well-suited for cross-country 
comparisons.   
16 According to Diener (2006), indicators of subjective well-being and ill-being can be used 
for the evaluation of policies in such diverse areas as health care, public health, social 
services, parks and recreation, work life, transportation, families, and the environment.  
17 However, the most extreme policy conclusions are not presented by Layard but by various 
authors of books on ‘affluenza’ written for a wide audience (see, for example, Hamilton and 
Denniss, 2005).    
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4. Some major interfaces of knowledge policy and happiness policy discourses  
 
Policies concerned with KBE issues directly and/or indirectly impact on happiness. 
However, as the discussion in Sections 2 and 3 has highlighted, the knowledge policy 
and happiness policy discourses have so far taken place without much direct 
interaction or mutual acknowledgement. Below I highlight some of their more 
obvious interfaces as suggested by my reading of the literature. They all concern the 
nexus of education, work, and innovation, which is at the core of KBEs.  
 
Education 
 
It is taken as self-evident that life-long education and learning in all its forms is 
central to facilitating, and coping with, the accelerating speed of change associated 
with the development of successful KBEs (OECD, 1996). It is a pre-requisite for 
obtaining ‘decent’ employment in a rapidly changing world (Reich, 2002), for 
speeding-up progress in science, technology and innovation, and for productivity 
growth. Lundvall and Johnson have coined the term ‘learning economy’ to highlight 
this central feature of KBEs.18 However, Helliwell (2003) reports, somewhat 
surprisingly, that education does not figure among his “Big Seven” factors having 
major direct impacts on happiness. Indeed, he finds education to have only small and 
insignificant effects. The positive effects of education on happiness are already 
captured by some Big Seven factors, especially income, health and trust, all of which 
are positively affected by an increase in education levels. In short, education seems to 
affect happiness mostly indirectly through its impact on other variables. This might be 
an important reason for the disconnectedness of much of the current knowledge policy 
and happiness policy literatures.  
   
Fortin (2005) seems to be one of the few analysts so far who puts forward a policy 
recommendation for economic growth in an advanced KBE that is explicitly 
influenced by insights from the happiness/SWB literature. He argues that instead of 
investing more in university education and training (the standard prescription derived 
from new growth theory) “Our foremost objective should be to raise average labour 
productivity not as much by encouraging our already productive as by bringing the 
low-productivity segment of our workforce closer to the median” (ibid., p. 3). In short, 
raising the skill levels of people at the bottom of the skill distribution is more likely to 
produce growth, reduce income inequality, and increase SWB.19  
 
Knowledge work, productivity, stress, unemployment  
 
The ‘human factor’ is central in KBEs because the crucial resource in such 
economies, i.e. knowledge, is mostly (and will mostly remain) centred in human 
brains, despite attempts to develop ‘expert systems’ for knowledge capture and 
decision making. In KBEs many more outputs then previously are either mostly the 
product of human brain activity and/or more intensive in such activity, at least until 
                                                 
18 For a discussion of the similarities and differences of the concepts of the KBE and the 
learning economy see, for example, Lundvall (2002).   
19 Frey and Stutzer (2002, p. 412) reference some research that suggests that the impact of 
income inequality on happiness varies between countries (Americans, for example, have less 
aversion to income inequality than Europeans). However, they also note that the impact of 
income inequality on happiness is a so far under-researched topic.    
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we enter the cyborg age or finally fulfil the old and so far elusive fundamental  
promise of artificial intelligence research. But this seems precisely the problem: 
Human brains are fragile, somewhat fickle and prone to malfunction, especially when 
put under pressure and managed inappropriately. Is it a coincidence that happiness in 
developed countries seems to have been stagnant since about the same time that 
researchers have noted the rise of the information/KBE and the rapidly increasing 
number of information/knowledge workers?20  
 
Lamberton (1997) has suggested that the mainstream KBE discourse misses the real 
significance of the dichotomy between tacit and codified knowledge. In essence, the 
role and importance of tacit knowledge is often underappreciated because it stands for 
the intrinsically subjective human element in knowledge production and transfer 
which is very difficult to measure and therefore often downplayed or forgotten. The 
dangerous belief now is that all important knowledge can be codified (ibid., p. 79). 
This is arguable an important reason for the often found pre-occupation with 
measurable aspects of KBEs, especially ICT and codified knowledge. In short, despite 
the enormous increases in the degree of codification of existing knowledge enabled by 
the developments in ICT, a large amount of knowledge is, and will remain, tacit and 
intangible, and therefore difficult to measure and manage. 
 
This was also recognized by Drucker (1999), who pointed out that the biggest 
contribution management needs to make in the 21st century is to increase the 
productivity of knowledge workers. Productivity increases comparable to those 
achieved by manual labour during the 20th century seem difficult to realise. 
Productivity growth in KBEs requires constant experimentation and re-organisation of 
work practices in order to reap the benefits of investment in ICT (see, for example, 
Bryjolfsson and Hitt, 2000), often leading to unhappiness and stress which in turn is 
known to reduce productivity.21 Therefore, policies aimed at producing a happier 
workforce are likely to go beyond enhancing the SWB of workers. They also increase 
productivity and profitability (Diener and Seligman, 2004). They should, therefore, be 
at the centre of attempts to increase productivity in KBEs.  
 
It has long been established that work can be a source of great happiness. It all 
depends on the nature of work and work practices.22 The issue whether KBEs, by 
their very nature, lead to increased mental health problems still seems undecided. For 
some, there is no question that work in KBEs reduces happiness. Cohen (2003), for 
example, argues that the new nature of work and work organisation in KBEs gives 
rise to an epidemic in work-related mental stress and mental illness. This is due to the 
                                                 
20 Machlup’s seminal book alerting fellow economists to the importance of knowledge 
production and distribution in the US economy was published in 1962 (Machlup, 1962). 
21 Layard (2005) has pointed out that management practices often reduce happiness by 
creating stress, especially if pay is performance-based while performance can’t be assessed 
objectively or easily, which seems typical of much knowledge work. In such situations people 
often get obsessed with how they rank compared to their peers.  
22 For a survey of findings on well-being effects resulting from work, see Diener and 
Seligman (2004). In general, people must have a feeling of control over what they do and 
work must be an outlet for one’s creativity. People seem to be most happy when they 
experience what psychologists call ‘flow’, i.e. being lost in a task that stretches a person 
without defeating him/her. Flow is a state of intensive and focused concentration in which 
enjoyment is maximised (Lakhani and Wolf, 2005).  
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fact that work intensity has increased because productivity gains are being sought 
through multitasking enabled by the use of ICT, pushing as many tasks as possible 
onto individuals. In Cohen’s (ibid., p. 39) words: “Stress becomes the way to regulate 
post-Fordist society. Living work becomes live work and the limit to the new labor 
organization of work is burnout”.     
 
There is also a long-established and extensive disciplinary and inter-disciplinary 
literature on the topic of ‘information overload’ faced by many knowledge workers, 
i.e. of having too much information instead of less, but useful and relevant, 
information.23 This can cause stress and anxiety, and impede decision making. The 
problem is only likely to grow in future. A recent study found that in 2006, the 
amount of digital information created, captured and replicated was about three million 
times the information in all the books ever written. It also forecasts a six fold annual 
growth in digital information from 2006 to 2010 (Gantz et al. 2007). In the presence 
of information overload, more information does not lead to better decision making. 
Instead, it is often better to base decisions on a few key facts or on tacit (i.e. 
unconscious) knowledge. This idea has also been popularised by Gladwell (2005), 
who argues that decisions made very quickly (snap judgements) can be every bit as 
good as those made after long deliberation. 
 
However, there are also dissenting voices. Veenhoven (2006, p. 39/40), for example, 
has countered the argument that life in modern society has increased the incidence of 
mental illness, particularly depression. At least at the aggregate level of analysis, he 
sees little evidence that KBEs have had a negative impact on happiness, rather the 
opposite.24 It seems the impact of work on happiness remains a highly contested 
topic. Moreover, how work practices and industrial relations in KBEs will evolve is, 
of course, uncertain,25 and so are the effects these developments might have on the 
happiness of workers.  
 
If work in KBEs is bad for happiness, unemployment is definitely worse. This seems 
to be a consensus opinion among happiness researchers. Being unemployed, even 
when receiving the same income as when employed, reduces people’s happiness. 
While work may be a burden, losing ones job does not just result in lost income, but a 
loss of sense of self, and great psychic and social costs. In fact, unemployment seems 
to reduce happiness more than any other single characteristic (Frey and Stutzer, 
2002). Layard (2005, p. 68), therefore, concludes that low and stable unemployment 
must be a major objective for any society. The difficult and controversial issue facing 
policy makers is, of course, how to get there in KBEs characterised by accelerated 
change. The answer will very much depend on one’s political convictions.  
                                                 
23 For an introduction to this literature see, for example, the surveys by Eppler and Mengis 
(2004) and Edmunds and Morris (2000). Synonymous with or closely related to information 
overload are terms like ‘cognitive overload’, ‘sensory overload’, ‘communication overload’, 
‘knowledge overload’, ‘information fatigue syndrome’, ‘infoglut’, ‘information deluge’, ‘data 
smog’, ‘analysis paralysis’, ‘information pollution’.  
24 It is possible that in modern societies people are simply more aware of how they feel. 
However, even if there has been a real rise in rates of depression, that can still co-exist with a 
rise in average happiness (Veenhoven, 2006, p. 40): “Modernization can be to the advantage 
of a majority, but can come at the expense of a minority, who are pushed into depression; ...”.  
25 Hodgson (1999) puts changing work practices and industrial relations at the centre of his 
search for possible KBE futures and sketches no less than seven possible scenarios. 
 16
 
Innovation 
 
Mainstream KBE analysts seem to have a rather limited view of the impacts of 
knowledge creation and innovation. As mentioned earlier, Foray (2006), commenting 
on what he sees as the essence of the economics of knowledge as a discipline, focuses 
on the role of socio-economic institutions to produce knowledge in an ‘efficient 
manner’, with the familiar conflict between ‘social well-being’ and private returns to 
knowledge being at the heart of the problem:  
 
“The unifying framework here is the character of knowledge as a 
semipublic good, with difficult-to-enforce property rights. Its diffusion is 
in principle good for social well-being but bad for private returns: No 
one wants to invest in the creation of new knowledge if the rents 
generated are not at least partly appropriable. Institutions that govern 
the creation and diffusion of knowledge are shaped by this trade-off: On 
the one hand they need to meet the objective of providing the ideal 
motivation to the private producers of knowledge while on the other they 
have to fulfil the social objective of ensuring efficient use of knowledge 
once it has been produced.” (Foray, 2006, p. 11).  
 
It appears to be symptomatic of the disjuncture between the economics of knowledge 
and happiness economics that Foray is silent about the impact of knowledge 
production, as a process, on the well-being of knowledge producers. Rather, he links 
social well-being to the subsequent use of the knowledge created.     
 
Turning to happiness researchers, Layard (2005, ch. 6) seems to be one of the few 
who puts the rise of KBEs at the heart of the happiness paradox. He regards S&T, 
which are core elements of KBEs, as the prime source of the changes that affect 
people’s attitudes and feelings. S&T have been responsible for the rise in our material 
standard of living and improvements in physical health, but they have also created 
offsetting negative trends that have negated the positive effects. In particular, he 
mentions adverse trends in changes in family life (broken families), weaker moral 
values (for example more crime) and declining community trust that have negatively 
affected happiness in rich countries. Layard argues that they are due to changes in 
gender roles, the spread of television and the growth of individualism, all of which 
have been ultimately driven by S&T.  
 
Apart from questioning this type of S&T determinism in general, one may also 
question some of the specific ‘negative effects’ mentioned by Layard, like, for 
example, labour-saving technological changes that allow women to reduce time spend 
on housework and join the paid workforce, or the fall in child mortality due to better 
health technology, or birth control technologies, or the decline in religious belief and 
the moral vacuum it has allegedly created, which, at least at first sight, might seem 
somewhat simplistic. However, what Layard (2005) has done is to put the links 
between KBEs and happiness research firmly on the agenda, although he never 
explicitly mentions the term KBE.  
 
Weehuizen et al. (2006) try to make the links between innovation in KBEs and 
happiness explicit. They report preliminary findings from a model that incorporates 
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the role of innovation as 1. a source of productivity growth 2. a source of stress 
affecting ‘mental capital’. They find that moderate stress might go hand in hand with 
productivity growth, while high levels of innovation may be counter-productive if 
they lead to high levels of stress that people cannot cope with. When Weehuizen’s 
(2006) final report was released, it created headlines like “Mental health problems 
threaten the knowledge economy” (UNU-MERIT, 2006). The attempt to increase 
knowledge worker productivity is reported to unequivocally damage KBEs’ mental 
capital. Giving knowledge workers more autonomy is adding substantially to their 
workload and pressure. Many knowledge workers find this difficult to mange, leading 
to ever greater levels of stress and mental health problems (ibid.). Governments 
should therefore invest more in the treatment of mental health related problems as 
well as into prevention. Weehuizen is reported to have said that “Each Euro spent on 
treatment of mental health related problems saves 20 to 30 Euros in future costs…” 
(ibid.).  
 
The relationship between innovation and happiness in KBEs is a vast and multi-
faceted topic that does not lend itself to simple answers. Happiness researchers seem 
to focus mostly on the negative impacts of innovation on happiness. Below I briefly 
discuss two issues reported in the literature that point to the possibility that in 
developed economies at least, causality might increasingly run from happiness to 
innovation and economic growth, i.e. happiness might increasingly become an 
explanatory variable in advanced KBEs.26    
 
Happiness is increasingly being mentioned by mainstream and non-mainstream 
analysts that focus on incentives or motivating factors for creative labour. For 
example, von Hippel (2005, 2006) emphasizes the phenomenon of user innovation, 
i.e. the democratising of innovation, often accompanied by users freely revealing their 
innovations. Enjoyment derived from innovating and problem-solving might tilt the 
balance of users’ innovate-or-buy decisions towards the former, both in terms of 
commercial and not-for-profit activities (von Hippel, 2006, p. 242-244). Others have 
focussed more narrowly on open source. They have included the role of having fun or 
joy derived from voluntary contributions to code of software products as at least one 
of the motivating factors for such activities (Hertel et al., 2003; Lakhani and Wolf, 
2005; Lerner and Tirole, 2006). Whatever the specific activity, fun or joy can lead to 
‘flow’.  
 
A closely related, but more speculative, issue is that of the role of happiness in 
shaping what might come after the current mostly proprietary-based KBEs. Benkler 
(2006), for example, argues that commons-based peer production activities 
conducted over the internet, which he terms ‘social production’, are emerging as a 
distinct mode of resource allocation and production of information, knowledge and 
culture in the digital age, potentially heralding a new stage in the development of 
KBEs. Social production is achieved by sharing creative labour and/or physical 
resources over the internet. Examples include SETI@home, Linux and Wikipedia. 
There is some evidence that cross-country variation in the participation in social 
                                                 
26 There seem to be only a few studies so far that directly explore the hypothesis that causality 
runs from happiness to economic outcomes. Examples are Kenny (1999) and Graham et al. 
(2004).   
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production projects might be related to the level of average happiness in a country, 
but more research is needed.27  
 
Mainstream KBE analysts are also beginning to recognise the new social 
organisations that enable rich voluntary spillovers and the importance of public 
knowledge (the knowledge commons) in general. Foray (2006, p. 14), while not going 
as far as Benkler, argues that these developments point to “an emerging paradigm of 
open, distributed systems of innovation and learning”. At present, however, social 
production is still a peripheral phenomenon existing alongside the proprietary-based 
KBEs that are the subject of the mainstream knowledge policy discourse.28  
 
The realisation of Benkler’s vision of social production being a mature feature of a 
new ‘networked information society’ depends on whether an institutional framework 
and policies that support, or at least not hinder, social production can be put in place 
and defended against competing interests of commercial producers, and other threats. 
The stakes for economic progress are potentially very high if it is true that optimising 
institutions for price-based production undermines social production, and if it is also 
true that current technological changes are improving the efficiency of social 
production. In that case, Benkler (2004, p. 281) argues, “we are making 
systematically mistaken policy choices not on the peripheries of our economies and 
societies, but at their very engines.” I argue that discussions about the future direction 
of KBEs would benefit from research that explores the links between social 
production and happiness economics.  
 
 
5. Diversity of beliefs and values about core KBE elements  
 
Inglehart et al. (2004) highlight the enormous cross-country diversity in people’s 
beliefs and values, including major and systematic differences between the groups of 
poor and rich countries, that emerge from the World Values Surveys. In their 
interpretation, SWB is a good proxy for the extent of ‘self-expression values’ in 
affluent societies, which themselves proxy for post-material values. By contrast, poor 
countries are characterised by ‘survival values’. The point I wish to emphasise is that 
even within a group of fairly homogenous rich countries, people’s beliefs and values 
about core KBE elements differ, sometimes greatly. These differences should be 
taken into account in the formulation of knowledge policy. Table 1 is included merely 
to indicate this diversity and how quickly beliefs and values can change over time. 
                                                 
27 See my analysis of the paradigmatic social production project SETI@home (Engelbrecht, 
2007). I find that in rich countries there is indeed statistically significant evidence of a 
positive correlation between the level of SWB and social production in terms of 
SETI@home. One interesting issue raised by Benkler is that of the importance, or otherwise, 
of social capital. He argues that it is not a prerequisite or social production, which mostly 
involves only very weakly connected communities or even total strangers. 
28 Kenway et al. (2006) argue that the dominant knowledge policy discourse is haunted by 
alternative economies, i.e. what they call the risk, gift, libidinal and survival economies. In 
their view, these alternative exchange systems are not normally acknowledged as this would 
highlight the shortcomings of the dominant discourse. Kenway et al. (ibid., p. 6) seek to “take 
‘the economy’ and ‘knowledge’ out of the hands of the economists”.  In short, they seem to be 
proposing to throw the baby out with the bathwater.         
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The countries included in the table are either English speaking or part of Protestant 
Europe (see ibid., Figure 2, p. 14).  
 
The ‘opinion about scientific advance’ variable is the percentage of people who 
responded ‘will help’ to the question “In the long run, do you think the scientific 
advances we are making will help or harm mankind?” (ibid., Table E022). The ‘more 
emphasis on technology’ variable is the percentage of people who answered ‘good’ to 
the question: “I’m going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that 
might take place in the near future. If it were to happen, do you think it would be a 
good thing, a bad thing, or don’t you mind? More emphasis on the development of 
technology.” The ‘trust’ variable is the percentage of people who answered ‘most 
people can be trusted’ to the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” 
(ibid., Table A165). The ‘feeling very happy’ variable is the percentage of people 
who answered ‘very happy’ to the question: “Taken all things together, would you 
say you are:” (ibid., Table A008). SWB is the widely publicised subjective well-being 
ranking based on combined happiness and life satisfaction scores from the World 
Values Survey.29
 
 
Table 1: Diversity of beliefs and values about science, technology, trust and 
happiness in a group of rich countries 
 
 Opinion 
about 
scientific 
advance (%) 
More 
emphasis on 
technology 
(%) 
Trust 
(%) 
Feeling very 
happy 
(%) 
SWB 
 1990 
wave 
2000 
wave 
1990 
wave 
2000 
wave 
1990 
wave 
2000   
wave 
1990 
wave 
2000 
wave 
2000 
wave 
US 63 56 70  57 52 36 41 39 3.5 
Canada 55 52 63 58 52 39 30 44 3.8 
Australia - 57 - 58 - 40 - 43 3.5 
NZ - 26 - 35 - 48 - 33 3.4 
Great Britain 48 40 64 70 44 30 38 - 2.9 
Ireland 40 41 61 69 47 35 44 42 4.2 
          
Sweden 47 44 35 35 66 66 41 37 3.4 
Norway 36 39 47 46 65 65 29 30 3.3 
Denmark 43 - 59 62 58 67 43 45 4.2 
Finland 42 - 68 55 63 58 20 24 3.2 
Iceland 54 66 69 85 44 41 41 47 4.2 
Germany 52 51 83 63 26 35 14 20 2.6 
Netherlands 37 - 47 48 56 60 48 46 3.9 
Switzerland - 39 57 34 43 41 36 40 4.00 
Source: Inglehart et al. (2004)  
 
                                                 
29 Inglehart (2005, p. 11) explains the construction of SWB as follows: “Happiness was rated 
on a four-point scale, on which high scores indicated low levels of happiness; life 
satisfaction was rated on a ten point scale on which high scores indicated high levels of 
satisfaction. To give both variables equal weight, the mean scores on the happiness scale 
were multiplied by 2.5 and subtracted from the life satisfaction scores.”   
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The percentage of respondents who thought scientific advance will be helpful in the 
long-run has fallen in most of the countries shown for which data for both years are 
available, with the exception of Iceland, Norway and Ireland. This is interesting, 
given that the countries in Table 1 are likely to account for a large proportion of 
worldwide R&D spending aimed at pushing out the knowledge frontier. The changes 
over time in the percentage of respondents who thought that more emphasis on the 
development of technology is a good thing are even more diverse, being about evenly 
split between rises and falls. Trust seems to have fallen in all English speaking 
countries, but there are an even number of falls and rises for Protestant European 
countries.30 The percentage of respondents feeling very happy has risen in seven out 
of the eleven countries shown for which data are available from both WVS waves.  
 
I argue that differences in societies’ attitudes concerning central elements of KBEs, 
such as those shown in Table 1, are a neglected aspect of the mainstream knowledge 
policy discourse. They should be included as more KBE-specific SWB indicators 
alongside a general SWB variable and ‘standard’ economic and social variables.31 
The precise way this is done and the weight they should be given relative to other 
indicators will depend on the question at hand and should be a legitimate topic for 
debate. 
 
KBE-specific SWB indicators might also be usefully included when devising 
typologies of KBEs. KBE typologies at various levels of geographical aggregation are 
being used in policy circles. For example, a recent report to the European 
Commission (Technopolis, 2006) evaluates European Union policies towards the 
development of KBEs at the regional level. Its authors extract four key factors from 
15 KBE indicators that are then used to develop a typology of regional KBEs. 
People’s beliefs and values are not among the 15 indicators the analysis is based on 
although some, like the unemployment rate and levels of education, will affect SWB 
directly and/or indirectly. In short, a KBE typology that includes both objective and 
subjective variables remains a task for the future. Such a typology might help us get 
closer to the formulation of wisdom-based knowledge policy.      
 
 
6. Concluding comments 
 
In this paper I have highlighted some of the key features of the current state of two 
major policy discourses, i.e. that of knowledge policy and of happiness policy, and 
their major interfaces, without pretending to have produced an exhaustive or 
necessarily representative survey. The discussion has been fairly general. However, 
there seems to be enough evidence from mainstream KBE analysts themselves to 
suggest that the currently unsatisfactory state of knowledge policy is pointing in the 
direction of including insights from happiness research. If it is accepted that happiness 
is the ultimate aim of economic activity, we arguably need a much closer relationship 
                                                 
30 The responses to the questions are also available by gender, as well as by age, education 
and income group etc. (see Inglehart et al., 2004). For example, there are clear differences in 
the responses to the science and technology related questions by gender, with the percentage 
reported being higher for males than females (except for Ireland).  
31 Note that Diener and Seligman (2004) and Diener (2006) argue that use of more specific 
SWB measures in addition to an overall measure of SWB will often be desirable.  
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between the two policy discourses. This would seem a promising step to get us closer 
to wisdom-based knowledge policy.  
 
People’s beliefs and values about specific core KBE elements should be taken 
explicitly into account in the formulation of knowledge policy. They provide 
additional vantage points highlighting the complexity and diversity of KBEs and 
societies which goes beyond that currently captured by mainstream economic and 
social indicators. The development of specifically KBE-related SWB indicators 
should be part of the search for a list of national SWB indicators being advocated by 
Diener and Seligman (2004) and Diener (2006). Which combination of subjective 
variables should be used will depend on the particular policy question at hand.    
 
Somewhat paradoxically, KBEs have increasingly become ‘unknown’ economies. 
This has produced repeated calls from mainstream analysts to develop more and more 
economic and social indicators to capture the elusive qualities of KBEs. However, it 
seems unlikely that the proliferation of KBE indicators can achieve what its 
developers hope for. Similarly, various international organisations seem constantly to 
be developing new composite indices that try to capture how well countries are 
prepared for the KBE. By definition, composite indices combine important elements 
that should be analysed separately, but more than anything they seem to fulfil the 
deep psychological need of analysts and policy makers to rank countries.  
 
There are signs that the lack of explicit mutual recognition and interaction of 
knowledge policy and happiness policy discourses highlighted in this paper might be 
slowly changing. For example, in the 2006 edition of the OECD’s publication 
“Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth” (OECD, 2006), the last chapter 
entitled “Alternative measures of well-being” contains at least one page on 
happiness/SWB measures. Also, the OECD, as well as other international 
organisations, is sponsoring or co-organising conferences on happiness.32 One may, 
therefore, hope that at some point in the not so distant future insights from happiness 
research will be taken into account in knowledge policy formulation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 To name but two recent examples: The international conference “Is happiness measurable 
and what do those measures mean for policy”, University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, Rome, 2-3 
April 2007, and the second OECD World Forum on “Statistics, knowledge and policy”, 
Istanbul, 27-30 June 2007.  
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